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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, a novel and efficient hardware implementation of steganographic cryptosystem based on a 
public-key cryptography is proposed. Digital images are utilized as carriers of secret data between sender 
and receiver parties in the communication channel. The proposed public-key cryptosystem offers a 
separable framework that allows to embed or extract secret data and encrypt or decrypt the carrier using 
the public-private key pair, independently. Paillier cryptographic system is adopted to encrypt and decrypt 
pixels of the digital image. To achieve efficiency, a proposed efficient parallel montgomery exponentiation 
core is designed and implemented for performing the underlying field operations in the Paillier 
cryptosystem. The hardware implementation results of the proposed steganographic cryptosystem show an 
efficiency in terms of area (resources), performance (speed) and power consumption. Our steganographic 
cryptosystem represents a small footprint making it well-suited for the embedded systems and real-time 
processing engines in applications such as  medical scanning devices, autopilot cars and drones. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the modern era of technology, sharing multimedia content has become easier and faster. As a 
result of that, malicious tampering and unauthorized data manipulation have been more accessible 
to the eavesdroppers over the communication channels. To prevent that, hiding data technique is 
one of the possible solutions that provides a reliable, safe and secure communication channels in 
applications such as image authentication, copyrights, and fingerprinting [1]. Hiding data in a 
carrier is referred to as steganography, which is the art of hiding secret data in a carrier in such a 
stealthy way that avoids the suspicion of unauthorized receivers.  
Secret data can be concealed in various carriers, but digital images are the most preferable and 
suitable carrier due to massive users and applications that have the frequent access to it on internet. 
Moreover, performing image filtering techniques, mechanisms and cryptographic systems over 
digital images is more efficient in the reconfigurable hardware platforms. There are three main 
key characteristics that determine the performance of steganographic cryptosystems: embedding 
rate, imperceptibly and robustness. Efficient cryptosystems have a balance realization between 
these three characteristics. The massive variety in digital image real-time embedded systems and 
applications makes them more vulnerable to the attacks from the hackers (e.g. steganalysis tools) 
[2] for malicious targets, as delivery services, sharing rides, spying and warfare. Securing the 
secret data (i.e. control data) and cover image (i.e. footage images) itself is one of the 
steganographic frameworks that is achieved to protect the stego image against the steganalysis 
attacks and providing privacy services. This implies to have another secure layer before or after 
concealing data, where a public-key cryptosystem is implemented by having different kinds of 
secret codes, which are so-called private and public keys. The computational complexity in such 
these frameworks is increased because of the time-resource consuming field operations presented 
in these public-key cryptosystems. 
Hardware platforms presents a strong flexibility for such these high computational-complexity 
cryptosystems [3]. Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) and Field Programmable 
Gate Array (FPGA) are very popular hardware platforms for designing and implementing 
cryptographic and image steganographic cryptosystems. FPGAs can provide a high performance 
that can be achieved by ASIC platforms, and they cost much less than ASICs [4] [5]. FPGAs are 
reconfigurable and physically secure devices, which are preferable platforms to the researchers 
for testing their implementations. ASICs/FPGAs platforms have many features and computational 
capabilities that improve the performance such as parallelism and pipelining architectures. Few 
steganographic hardware implementations have been designed [6] [7] [8], which aim to increase 
the processing speed (throughput), less consumed area (resources), higher embedding rates, better 
image quality (PSNR) and robustness (security).   
In [7], a hardware cryptoprocessor for privacy-preserving data mining algorithm is implemented 
using the paillier cryptosystem. Parallelism is applied through exploiting the independency among 
the modular operations such as multiplications and exponentiations. Pipelined stages are inserted 
among the field operations to break the long critical data paths. The cryptoprocessor is evaluated 
using privacy-preserving matching set intersection protocol. The authors provide a deep hardware 
realization of the privacy-preserving scheme using FPGA platform. As a case study, the 
cryptoprocessor is integrated into a privacy preserving set intersection protocol. A performance 
evaluation for the protocol is performed between the hardware and the software implementations. 
In [7], the parallelism is applied through duplicating instances of the independent modular 
operations resulting in using more resources. For example, the modular exponentiation operation 
is replicated twice for performing two exponents with different bases. Pipelining is done by 
utilizing DSP blocks to break up the long critical data paths, which leads to enhance the running 
frequency. Buffering the operations is employed to maintain the parallel execution between the 
elements of these operations. Extensive pipelining and buffering produce more cycles to perform 
modular operations. Modular exponentiation is performed using right-to-left binary algorithm, 
which includes repeating the modular multiplications based on the exponent. Right-to-left binary 
algorithm does not provide high performance when the base of the exponent is fixed all the time 
of processing intermediate values till the final result. 
In this paper, a new high-performance public-key image steganographic framework is designed 
and implemented using FPGA reconfigurable hardware platform. The paillier public-key 
cryptosystem is used to encrypt pixels of the cover images [9]. Pixels of the  cover image are 
encrypted by paillier cryptosystem with a public key to generate an encrypted image. After that, 
a stego image is generated by performing an embedding process where a secret data is concealed 
into the encrypted image. In a reversible way, the receiver, who has the private part (i.e. private 
key) of the public key, can decrypt the received loaded-encrypted stego image. The result is a 
loaded stego image that has the secret data. Extracting process is applied after. Reconstructing the 
cover image is done as a last step by sorting the decrypted pixels. 
Figure 1 illustrates the general framework of the public-key image steganographic cryptosystem. 
Parallelism is applied to improve the computational complexity in the paillier cryptosystem, and 
efficient transitions are considered in the finite state machines that control each main component 
in the proposed cryptosystem. For validating purposes, the full image steganographic 
cryptosystem is implemented in these FPGA devices introduced by Xilinx [10]. 
 Figure 1.  The general framework of the proposed public-key image steganographic 
cryptosystem. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces a background for the paillier public-key 
cryptosystem. Section 3 presents the hardware architecture design for the proposed public-key 
image steganographic framework. The proposed steganographic cryptosystem evaluation in terms 
of embedding rate (bpp), image quality (PSNR), speed, resources utilization, power consumption 
and throughput are presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes this paper. 
2. PAILLIER CRYPTOSYSTEM  
Paillier cryptosystem is a probabilistic public-key (e.g. asymmetric) cryptographic algorithm, 
which was invented by Pascal Paillier in 1999 [9]. It's based on the RSA computational-
complexity public-key algorithm. Paillier cryptosystem has the n-th residue problem, where 
finding the composite n-th residue is believed to be computationally hard. The feature 
homomorphic property [9] in paillier cryptosystem makes it very appealing to be used and 
integrated in privacy-preserving embedded systems as in transferring money and electronic voting 
campaigns applications.  
The textbook version of RSA is a deterministic public-key algorithm (i.e. no random components) 
[11], which makes it vulnerable to the chosen-plaintext attacks by exploiting the multiplicative 
property [12] [13]. In this attack, the attacker can distinguish between the ciphertexts, and this 
kind of RSA implementation is referred to as non-semantic cryptosystem. To resist this type of 
attacks, padding schemes for RSA is applied by embedding some random paddings into the 
plaintexts before starting encryption process [14]. This makes RSA is a semantic secure 
algorithm, which means the attackers could not distinguish between the ciphertexts.  
Padded RSA cryptosystem does not support the homomorphic property since the randomness 
injected to the plaintext before encryption [15], hence RSA can be either semantically secure or 
homomorphic cryptosystem. On the other hand, Paillier cryptosystem is a semantic-homomorphic 
cryptosystem. However, the price to pay is that paillier cryptosystem consumes more resources 
with equivalent security level with RSA [15]. Paillier cryptosystem requires more modular 
exponentiation and multiplications field operations than the RSA. The next is a brief of how the 
encryption and decryption are processed in paillier cryptosystem. 
 
2.1. Key GENERATION in Paillier Cryptosystem 
At any public-key cryptosystem, there is a  key generation pre-process is done by the receiver, 
where public and private keys are generated for the encryption and decryption processes [16]. In 
paillier cryptosystem, the receiver chooses two large primes, q and p, the Great Common Divisor 
(GCD) for q.p and (q − 1) (p − 1) = 1, A hard-to-factor number n = q.p and λ = LCM ((q − 1) (p 
− 1)) are obtained, where LCM is the Least Common Multiple. The receiver randomly selects g 
in the 𝑍𝑛2
∗  field, where GCD (L( gλ mod n2), n) = 1, and L(x) = (x-1)/n [16]. The receiver finally 
distributes his public key pair (n, g), and the λ is considered as the private key for that public key. 
2.2. Encryption and Decryption in Paillier Cryptosystem 
The sender has a message M ∈  𝑍𝑛
∗ , then a random integer r ∈  𝑍𝑛
∗  is selected for semantic security 
[1]. The ciphertext C of that M is computed using the following equation: 
C = ENCpk (M, r) = g
M rn mod n2 (1) 
where ENC is the process of encryption and pk is the public key of the receiver. The ciphertext C 
is transmitted through the communication channel, the receiver gets it, and performs the following 
to reveal the original message M: 
M = DECpr (C) = L (C
λ mod n2) / L (gλ mod n2) mod n   (2) 
where DEC is the process of decryption, L(x) = (x-1)/n, and pr is the private key of the receiver. 
2.3. Homomorphic Properties in Paillier Cryptosystem 
The power of paillier cryptosystem comes from the additive homomorphic properties, which 
makes it a very suitable cryptosystem for electronic applications that require hiding identities as 
privacy-preserving perspective [17]. At the encryption process, let say we have two encrypted 
messages, E1 and E2, such as: E1 = ENCpk (M1, r1) and E2 = ENCpk (M2, r2). These two 
encrypted messages are considered as an additive homomorphic function at decryption process 
as follows: 
DECpr (E1,E2) = M1 + M2 mod n (3) 
To verify that, check the encryption process for both messages as follows: 
ENCpk (M1, r1) × ENCpk (M2, r2) = g
M1 gM2 rnrn mod n2  =  g M1+ M2 rnrn mod n2 (4) 
Another form of additive homomorphic property is multiplying ENCpk (M1, r1) with g
M2, which 
will give us the sum of the corresponding messages: M1 + M2. For multiplicative homomorphic 
property, an encrypted message ENCpk (M1, r1) is raised to a constant k, the decryption is the 
message k.M1 as shown in the following equation: 
DECpr (ENCpk (M1, r1)
 k mod n2) = k.M1 mod n
 (5) 
3. THE PROPOSED HARDWARE ARCHITECTURE DESIGN 
In this section, the structure of the proposed image steganographic cryptosystem is presented. The 
structure consists of components that works together to embed-extract and encrypt-decrypt a 
single pixel. We should mention that all pixels of the cover image are within gray-scale levels 
(e.g. 0 to 255). Each component at both encryption and decryption processes is controlled by an 
efficient finite state machine. Figure 2 represents the main components of the proposed 
steganographic cryptosystem, and paillier cryptosystem is used for encrypting and decrypting 
pixels. 
 
Figure 2.  The main components of the proposed steganographic cryptosystem in encryption and 
decryption processes. 
3.1. Image Embedding and Encryption 
To protect and increase the robustness, encrypting the pixels of the cover image is performed first, 
and then the embedding process is done to the encrypted cover image. Least Significant Bit (LSB) 
is one of the low-complexity steganographic schemes that can be applied to embed the secret data 
into pixels of the cover image. Increasing the capacity of the concealed data (e.g. high bpp) can 
be achieved by embedding more bits into a single pixel. However, this results in a degradation of 
quality for the cover image (e.g. lower PSNR) since original bits are altered. In our proposed 
cryptosystem, the embedding procedure doesn’t require to change any single bit in pixels of the 
cover image. This provides us the capability of recovering the cover image without decreasing 
the quality of the cover image (100% PSNR). For instance, assume the cover image has a 
resolution 64 rows x 64 columns (4096 pixels). the cover image can conceal up to 4096 bits of 
secret data, which equals to 512 bytes. Embedding single is done by using the additive 
homomorphic property of the paillier cryptosystem. Each pixel P is divided into two values (M1 
and M2) in such a way that P = M1 + M2. Each value is encrypted using Equation 1 to obtain EM1 
and EM2. The embedding is done as follows; if secret bit is 1 and EM1 < EM2, Swap EM1 and EM2 
values. If secret bit is 0 and EM1 > EM2, Swap EM1 and EM2 values. The embedding is done when 
all bits of the secret data are scanned. Note that sequence of selected pixels is defined using a data 
hiding key shared between sender and receiver.  
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Equation 1 states that, to encrypt pixel (e.g. plain text), we should raise g to the power of pixel 
value, and multiply it with a randomly selected r value to the power of n. The result then is reduced 
(mod) to the selected field (n2). These two exponentiations over modulus are very common in 
modular arithmetic computations in public-key cryptography. Single modular exponentiation (C) 
computes the remainder of the base (b) raised to the exponent (e) power as C = be mod n where 0  
≤ C < n. Performing this kind of modular operations is done by using different algorithms. Binary 
Left-to-Right exponentiation algorithm is one of the easiest and trivial way to compute ge. In 
binary algorithm, the bits of e are scanned, then perform 1 squaring every time and 1 field 
multiplication when the current bit equal to 1. In 1985, P. Montgomery proposed a new algorithm 
to compute the modular multiplication operations efficiently [18]. He proposed to map the 
presentation of the elements in any field Zn to a corresponding domain, which is called as 
Montgomery Domain (MD). Assume the modulus n and x are integers in  Zn, Consider R is the 
radix 2k, where k is the number of bits in modulus n, and GCD (n, R) = 1. Mapping the x to the 
montgomery domain is done as XMD = x · R mod n. The natural representation of the x in 
montgomery domain can be obtained by multiplying the XMD by the multiplicative inverse of the 
considered R radix x = XMD · R
-1 mod n. Multiplying x and y is done by first moving them to the 
montgomery domain, then observing the ZMD = XMD · YMD mod n can hold the following: 
XMD · YMD = x · R · y · R = z · R
2 mod n = ZMD · R mod n
 (6) 
A reduction is required to obtain the result ZMD = ZMD · R
-1 mod n, which a montgomery reduction 
is applied for that easily. Since the z is what we are looking for, the montgomery multiplication 
combines the reduction ZMD · R
-1 = z and multiplication x · y operations to compute the product of 
two integers. Performing the montgomery modular exponentiation ge mod n can be done by 
combining the binary exponentiation and the montgomery multiplication. Algorithm 1 shows this 
kind of combination. It consists of k executions for the main loop, which contains two 
montgomery multiplication. For single montgomery multiplication, the computational time is to 
3.k.T [19], where T is the execution time for a single full-adder. So, the total computational time 
for ge mod n is equal to 6.k2.T.  
Algorithm 1 Montgomery Exponentiation Algorithm 
Input: g = gk −1,gk −2 · · · g0, e = ek −1,ek −2 · · · e0, ek −1 = 1, and n = nk −1,nk −2 · · · n0. 0 ≤  g < n ,  
A = 2k mod n,  e _2k = 22k mod n 
Output: A = ge mod n 
g′ ← MontP (g, e_2k);                                 ▷ MontP is Montgomery multiplication  
for i = k - 1 downto 0 do 
A  ←  MontP(A, A) ; 
if ei == 1 then 
A ←   MontP(A, g′); 
end if  
end for 
A ← MontP(A, 1) ;  
Return A; 
 
Equation 1 states to encrypt a message, we need to get the multiplication result of gM and rn 
exponent pair. Algorithm 2 presents the proposed Montgomery Simultaneous Exponentiation 
(MSE) to calculate different exponents with two bases, which uses the Left-to-Right method. As 
shown, four precomputed parameters have to be obtained first. The for loop is performed when 
the exponents e0 and e1 are not zeros. Thus, the computation time of the MSE depends on the 
exponents, more ones in the exponents mean more montgomery multiplications. The computation 
time for the MSE with k-bit bases and exponents is given by (7/4).k.TMontP, where TMontP is the 
computational time of a single montgomery multiplication [19].  
 
Algorithm 2 Montgomery Simultaneous Exponentiation (MSE) Algorithm 
Input: g0 = g 0k −1 , g0k −2 · · · g 00 , g1 = g1k −1 , g1k −2 · · · g10 , e0 = e0k −1 , e0k −2 · · · e00 , e0k −1 = 1, e1 = e1k 
−1 ,e1k −2 · · · e10 , e1k −1 = 1, and e _2k = 2
k mod n 
Output: A = g0
e0 g1
e1  mod n 
g
0
′   ← MontP (g0, e_2k);  g1
′   ← MontP (g
1
, e_2k);  
g
01
′   ← MontP (g
0
′, g
1
′);     A   ← MontP (e_2k,1);  
for i = k - 1 downto 0 do 
A  ←  MontP(A, A) ; 
switch e0i , e1i    do  
case 0, 1 
A ← MontP (A, g
0
′); 
case 1, 0 
A ← MontP (A, g
1
′); 
case 1, 1 
A ← MontP (A, g
01
′); 
end for 
A ← MontP (A, 1);  
Return A 
 
Figure 3 represents the proposed architecture of the MSE core, which has three main components: 
the montgomery multiplication, RAM-based unite for the precomputed parameters, and finite-
state-machine control unite. Initially, the four precomputed parameters are calculated and stored. 
The for loop in Algorithm 2 is applied by scanning the bit-stream of the exponents e0 and e1, then 
one of the cases is applied accordingly. Note that in each iteration, the value of A is updated so 
the right result is maintained. The final result is obtained by performing a single montgomery 
multiplication MontP(A,1), which converts it back to the natural representation. 
 
Figure 3.  Architecture of the proposed Montgomery Simultaneous Exponentiation (MSE) core. 
3.2. Domain of the Loaded-encrypted Pixels 
In any field 𝑍𝑛
∗ , all values are ∈ [0, n-1], and any applied operation over these values must get the 
result into the field by applying mod n operation. In equation 1, the mod is mod n2, which means 
the field is squared, and the results are going to be out of the ∈ [0, n2-1] range. The pixels in cover 
image are gray-scale levels ∈ [0, 255], and encrypting these pixels will generate results up to (n2 
- 1). These encrypted pixels are viewed as a loaded-encrypted stego image, and rendering it is not 
possible in a gray-scale image. The only way to overcome this rendering issue is to divide each 
pixel into 3 bytes, each byte represents a channel in RGB image. Figure 4 illustrates the process 
of rendering the encrypted pixels into RGB stego image. The loaded-encrypted stego image is 
sent to the receiver to decrypt and extract the secret data out of the RGB stego image. 
 
Figure 4.  Rendering the loaded-encrypted image into RGB stego image. 
3.3. Image Decryption and Extraction 
On the receiver side, the RGB stego image is entered into a reversible separable decryption and 
extraction mechanism. The decryption process is applied to every single pixel in the received 
image. A private key λ is required as stated in equation 2. The receiver will be able to extract the 
secret data without decrypting pixels of the stego image. Decrypting the received image will 
generate the original cover image using the private key. Using homomorphic property in Equation 
3, the pixel P is equal to  DECpr (EM1, EM2) = M1 + M2. Extraction process is done by comparing 
encrypted pixel pairs EM1 and EM2. If EM1 > EM2, the secret bit is 1, and if the EM1 < EM2, the secret 
bit is 0. The extraction is done when all encrypted pairs are scanned.  
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
In this section, the results for the hardware implementation of the steganographic cryptosystem 
are presented. Verilog Hardware Description Language (HDL) is used to implement the proposed 
cryptosystem. Verifying the performance of the proposed design is achieved by using the FPGA 
platform devices which are provided by Xilinx [10], where two FPGA families are used, Artix-7 
and Kintex-7 devices [10]. Both FPGA devices are fabricated using the common 28nm 
technology. The Kintex-7 targets the high-density complex applications such as those in 3G and 
4G communications, while the Artix-7 FGPA provides mid-performance for the applications 
running over power-sensitive systems including the vision cameras and low-end wireless 
networks. The hardware implementation has been fully synthesized, translated, placed and routed 
using the new Xilinx Vivado 2018.2 design suite. A balance design strategy is applied as an 
optimization goal. A time constraint is applied, and the timing constraints report provides a zero 
timing error. Table 1 shows the results for the proposed steganographic cryptosystem after place 
and route.  
Embedding-encryption module implementation provides a running frequency up to 135.2 MHz 
using 193 slices of the available resources in Artix-7 FGPA. In Decryption-extraction module 
implementation, up to 166.7 MHz of running frequency is achieved with 334 slices. Block RAMs 
(BRAMs) are used as a memory to read the cover image and write the loaded encrypted stego 
image. More BRAMs are utilized when the size of the cover image is increased. The modules in 
Kintex-7 provides higher running frequencies between 250 MHz to 333.3 MHz in embedding 
encryption and decryption-extraction, respectively. The total on-chip power consumption is 
measured through calculating the power required by the resources in the hardware implementation 
such as clock, slices (i.e. LUTs and registers) and BRAMs unites at the maximum running 
frequencies. For the embedding-encryption module, our design consumes 0.139 Watt for 64x64 
cover image to 0.134 Watt for 256x256 cover, while the decryption-extraction module takes up 
to 0.362 Watt of power consumption for 256x256 cover image. The results in Table 1 can tell that 
our proposed cryptosystem is suitable for the limited-resources low-power embedded systems. 
Table 1.  Place and route results for encryption and decryption processes. 
Size Device 
Encryption Decryption 
Slices F.F LUT BRAM Freq. Slices F.F LUT BRAM Freq. 
64 
Artix 
148 390 409 1.5 135.2 326 971 768 4 166.7 
128 151 388 411 5 134.8 317 980 774 8.5 166.5 
256 193 409 469 20 133.3 334 1000 819 34 166.6 
64 
Kintex 
155 390 429 1.5 286 333 967 854 4 333.3 
128 165 388 430 5 270.27 347 980 866 8.5 333.3 
256 179 409 499 20 250 349 1000 850 34 333.3 
 
4.1. Prototyping the Proposed Image Steganographic Cryptosystem 
FPGA device, MATLAB program is used to convert the cover image to a hex format file. The 
file is loaded into the BRAMs of the FPGA device. Each pixel is read from a specific location 
(i.e. address) and got it ready for embedding the secret data and encrypt it. The loaded-encrypted 
pixel is written back to the BRAM at the same location. Once all pixels are loaded by the secret 
data and encrypted, the loaded-encrypted pixels are extracted from the BRAM and converted to 
a hex readable file. This file is forwarded to a MATLAB program for the rendering purposes. As 
mentioned earlier, the rendering process makes the extracted file from the FPGA to be shown as 
RGB stego image, which is done by allocating a single byte to each channel: red, green and blue. 
Table 2 represents four gray-scale images (lena, camera man, crowd and barbara) as cover images 
for the proposed steganographic cryptosystem. Each is represented in 3 different sizes: 64x64, 
128x128 and 256x256.  
Table 2.  Four different sizes gray-scale cover images. 
lena camera man 
64x64 128x128 256x256 64x64 128x128 256x256 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
crowd barbara 
64x64 128x128 256x256 64x64 128x128 256x256 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
These cover images are the input to the cryptosystem, the secret data as well. For example, if the 
64x64 cover image is the input, the secret data has 64x64 or 4096 bits are going to be concealed. 
Table 3 shows RGB stego images for the cover images under different sizes. Note that for each 
original cover image at any size, a random secret data is generated to achieve randomness in the 
results (i.e. RGB stego images). As shown, the stego images are rendered differently from size to 
another. The stego images are ready for transmitting to the receiver for recovering original images 
and extracting secret data reversibly. 
Table 3. RGB stego images for cover images. 
lena camera man 
64x64 128x128 256x256 64x64 128x128 256x256 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
crowd barbara 
64x64 128x128 256x256 64x64 128x128 256x256 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
The receiver will perform the reversible decryption and extraction processes to recover the 
original cover image and get the secret data. To perform that, the received stego image is 
converted to a text hex format file by running a MATLAB program. Then, this file is loaded to 
the BRAMs of the FPGA, where each pixel is decrypted, and bits of secret data are extracted. The 
decrypted pixel is written back to the BRAM at same address of the encrypted pixel. This is 
applied to all pixels in the stego image. Once all pixels are decrypted, a file is extracted from the 
BRAMs in a hex readable format. The file is forwarded to a MATLAB program to gather all 
decrypted pixel and render them into a gray-scale original cover image. Table 4 represents the 
decrypted original cover images for the RGB stego images at the receiver side. 
Table 4. Decrypted cover images at the receiver side. 
lena camera man 
64x64 128x128 256x256 64x64 128x128 256x256 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
crowd barbara 
64x64 128x128 256x256 64x64 128x128 256x256 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR) is a subjective indicator for the quality of an image, which is 
measured in decibels (dB). The higher PSNR value indicates maintaining better quality. In the 
proposed steganographic, 100% PSNR is achieved since there is no loss in cover images, thus the 
receiver can recover any kind of cover images perfectly. For embedding rate, the proposed 
cryptosystem always offers a fixed rate of 1 bpp. As quantitative metric for the performance, the 
throughput of the steganographic cryptosystem is defined as the total bits that cryptosystem can 
process per time unit. The following equation shows how to calculate the throughput for the 
proposed cryptosystem.  
Throughput = 
Input-Data  .  Frequency
Clock Cycles of Encryption or Decryption  
 
 
(7) 
Table 5 shows the performance results in terms throughput and Frame Per Second (fps) for the 
embedding-encryption and decryption-extraction hardware FPGA implementations in different 
cover images. It’s expected to get large number of clock cycles in the proposed cryptosystem due 
to the intensive field operations in the paillier cryptosystem. To encrypt a single pixel, 1520 clock 
cycles are required, and decrypt it requires 1460 clock cycles. Note that the decryption is 
performed over RGB pixels. From Table 5, FPS rate is calculated as number of pixels in one 
image divided by the throughput. For instance, it is possible to process 22.3 fps in embedding-
encryption module, and 28.6 fps in decryption-extraction module for 128x128 cover image in 
real-time embedded system. For 1-minute period, the proposed cryptosystem can process a video 
of 21.9 MB size at 22.3 fps and 84.3 MB size at 28.6 fps in embedding-encryption and decryption 
extraction module hardware implementations, respectively. 
Table 5.  Performance results for different cover images. 
Cover 
Image 
Size 
Throughput (Kpps) FPS 
Encryption Decryption Encryption Decryption 
lena 
64 192.7 207.6 47.1 50.7 
Cameraman 
crowd 
barbara 
lena 
128 365.2 468.5 22.3 28.6 
Cameraman 
crowd 
barbara 
lena 
256 676.4 937.1 10.4 14.3 
Cameraman 
crowd 
barbara 
 
Table 6 represents a comparison between the proposed hardware implementation of the paillier 
cryptosystem and other implementations. Our design outperforms the works in terms of PSNR, 
utilized slices and frequency. In paper [6], the hardware implementation is designed using 
interpolation expansion method. The design achieved a high performance in terms of the 
throughput, which is capable of processing about 7640 pixels in a single second using Virtex-6 
FPGA Device. On the other hand, a huge amount of resources as register and LUTs are utilized, 
where it requires around 10 times of the resource utilized by our design, and our design consumes 
less power by 91.5% than the work in [6]. In [20], a pipelined reversible hardware architecture 
for secret water marking embedding is proposed, where the Reversible Contrast Mapping (RCM) 
algorithm is adopted for embedding and extraction secret data. The architecture offers low-
complexity fast processing through breaking the critical path of the design into 6 pipelined stages. 
However, our hardware architecture is faster, requires less resources and achieves higher 
throughput than the work in [20].  
The work in [21] represents methods of encapsulating secret data into a group n of pixels in a 
(2n+1)-ary notational system. The hardware implementation offers high fps but with low PSNR 
and high utilized resources, where 16% of the total resources in Virtex -7 FPGA device is roughly 
12,000 logic cells. The power consumption in [21] is very high, it is 3.807 Watt, while our 
hardware implementation consumes between 0.139 Watt to 0.362 Watt of power. We should 
mention that the hardware implementations in [6], [7], [20] and [21] do not apply any kind of 
cryptographic algorithms. To the best of our knowledge, our proposed reconfigurable 
implementation for image steganography using paillier cryptosystem is the first to present in the 
literature. Figure 5 represents a comparison between our proposed steganographic scheme with 
other works [22] and [23] in terms of image quality and embedding rate. The image quality is 
always 100% PSNR regardless of the embedding rates.  
Table 6.  Performance comparison with existing implementations for image steganography. 
Ref. 
Image 
Size 
Device bpp PSNR Slices LUT F.F Freq.  
Throughput 
(Kpps) 
[6] 328x264 
Virtex-5 1 x x 9,715 4883 96.4 7340.17 
Virtex-6 1 x x 8,564 4908 100.4 7640.63 
[7] 128x128  Spartan-6 1 51.1444 160 322 214 104.971 x 
[21] 512x512 Virtex-7 1 45.11 16% 1% 2% 144 x 
[20] 32x32 Spartan-3 0.46 29.46 9881 11291 9347 98 100.3 
Ours 
128x128 Artix-7 1 100% 151 774 980 134.8 370 
256x256 Kintex-7 1 100% 179 850 1000 250 680 
 
 
Figure 5.  Comparison of PSNR vs embedding rate performance between the proposed 
steganographic scheme and others. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, a hardware architecture for a separable image steganographic scheme using paillier 
cryptosystem is designed and implemented on reconfigurable FPGA platforms. An efficient 
montgomery simultaneous exponentiation is implemented for performing exponentiation 
operations in encryption and decryption of paillier cryptosystem. The place and routed results 
have demonstrated a high performance in terms of speed, utilized resources and power 
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consumption in the new Kintex-7 and Artix-7 Xilinx FPGA devices. Our proposed 
steganographic achieves a guaranteed 100% PSNR for any kind of cover images with a fixed 1 
bpp of embedding capacity. In real-time embedded system, our proposed hardware architecture 
is able to embed and encrypt up to 47.1 fps of cover images. In decryption-extraction processes, 
the hardware architecture can perform up to 28.6 fps of RGB stego images. The proposed secure 
architecture offers a small footprint which can be utilized in many embedded applications as 
graphic processing engines and accelerators.  
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